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COMPENSATING THE INNOCENT ACCUSED
KEITH S. ROSENN*
[Plenal law governs the strongest force that we permit official agen-
cies to bring to bear on individuals. Its promise as an instrument of
safety is matched only by its power to destroy.**
The United States has lagged far behind many nations' in its
failure to compensate the innocent victims of erroneous criminal
accusations. Despite the relatively advanced development of tort law
in the United States, no American jurisdiction presently provides for
public compensation to an innocent person who has been duly acquit-
ted, or against whom all criminal charges have been dismissed or
dropped. 2 Indeed, only the federal government and four states have
statutes that in certain circumstances provide for compensation to a
person imprisoned after conviction for a crime that he did not com-
mit.3 Damages resulting from a formal criminal accusation can be
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** Wechsler, The Challenge ofa Model Penal Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (1952).
1 E.g., Sweden, Norway, Denmark, France, Italy, West Germany, Switzerland, and
Japan. See S. DANDO, JAPANESE LAW OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 527 et seq. (1965); Bratholm,
Compensation of Persons Wrongfully Accused or Convicted in Norway, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
833 (1961); Glod, A Comparative Survey of the Unjust Conviction Laws in the United States,
France and West Germany, REVUE DROIT PEN. MILITAIRE 7 (1969); Righetti, La Riparazione
All'Imputato e AlrAccusato e il Guidizio SulleSpese in Caso diAbbandono delProcedimento
Penale o di Assoluzione nel Diritto Cantonale e nel Diritto Federale (Art. 122 Procedura Penale
Federale) in Particolare de Lege Ferenda, 79 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 421a
(1960).
2 A Note on American Law. 109 U. PA. L. REV. 845 (1961). One partial and short-lived
exception was Nebraska's curious "Self-Defense Act," enacted in 1969. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
114 (Cum. Supp. 1969). It provided, inter alia, that:
When substantial question of self defense. . .shall exist, which needs legal investiga-
tion or court action for the full determination of the facts, and the defendant's actions
are subsequently found justified . . . , the State of Nebraska shall indemnify or
reimburse the defendant for all loss of time, legal fees, court costs, or other expenses
involved in his defense.
This statute was declared unconstitutional on unrelated grounds in State v. Goodseal, 186 Neb.
359, 183 N.W.2d 258 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 845, and repealed by Leg. Bill 187, § 1,
[1971] Neb. Laws Ist Sess.
I California and Wisconsin first adopted compensation statutes in 1913, followed by
North Dakota in 1917, the federal government in 1938, New York in 1942, and Illinois in 1957.
North Dakota repealed its statute in 1965. Ch. 203, § 86, [19651 Laws of N.D.
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devastating to an innocent person, not only because of the high costs
of criminal defense work, but also because of the sizeable reputation
damage and mental anguish normally associated with such accusa-
tions.
This article'argues that it is unconscionable to force the innocent
to bear these often crushing costs of malfunctions of the criminal
justice system, and that a right to compensation for damages result-
ing from erroneous criminal charges should be created. The article
explores liability theories upon which this right might be based, as
well as the difficulties in determining the meaning of innocence. Fi-
nally, the article suggests several techniques by which a right to com-
pensation might be implemented.
The procedures for obtaining relief under these statutes vary. In California one who has
been convicted, imprisoned, and pardoned by the governor, on the ground that the criminal
act was either not committed or not committed by the accused, may present a claim to the
state board of control. Not only must the claimant establish his innocence, but he must also
show that he neither negligently nor intentionally contributed to his arrest or conviction. If
satisfied that the claimant meets these strict requirements for compensation, the board may
recommend to the legislature an award of compensation, not to exceed $10,000. CALI PENAL
CODE §§ 4900-4906 (West 1970).
In Wisconsin a board must find that a petitioner is innocent beyond a reasonable doubt
of the crime for which he was imprisoned, and that his act or failure to act did not contribute
to his being convicted. The board may award up to $1,500 for each year of wrongful imprison-
ment, although the total award is limited to $5,000. Wis. STAT. § 285.05 (1958), as amended
(Supp. 1975).
In Illinois and New York courts of claims have jurisdiction to hear suits for compensation
for erroneous imprisonment. In both states the claimant must have served all or part of his
term and have been pardoned by the governor because of innocence. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 37, §
439.8(c) (1973); N.Y. Cr. CL. AcT § 9 (3-a) (McKinney 1963). In Illinois the maximum award
is $15,000 for up to five years of wrongful imprisonment, $30,000 for five to fourteen years.
and $35,000 for more than fourteen years. In addition, the claimant is entitled to an award for
attorney's fees, not to exceed 25% of the compensation awarded. There is no limit upon the
amount of compensation that may be awarded under the New York statute.
The federal statute requires a claimant who has served all or part of his sentence to bring
suit in the Court of Claims. As a condition of recovery the claimant must obtain either a pardon
or a certificate of innocence, usually from the court which had convicted him, reciting that the
claimant was innocent of the offense for which he was convicted and that his own conduct did
not contribute to bring about his arrest or conviction. Recovery is limited to $5,000. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2513 (1970). Attorneys' fees may not be awarded. Marsh v. United States, 48 F.R.D. 315
(W.D. Va. 1969).
Some of the New York cases illustrate the gross inadequacies of these damage litigation
provisions. In 1955 the court of claims awarded $112,290 for twelve years of erroneous impris-
onment. Hoffner v. State, 207 Misc. 1070, 142 N.Y.S.2d 630 (Ct. Cl. 1968). In 1968 an award
of $300,000 was made for erroneous confinement in a mental hospital for twelve years. Whitree
v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 693, 290 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Ct. Cl. 1968).
In many jurisdictions the only hope for a victim of erroneous imprisonment is passage of
a private bill of compensation. See Note, Compensation of Persons Erroneously Confined by
the State, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1091, 1107-09 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Note, Compensation].
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I. PROSECUTING THE INNOCENT
In an ideal world only the guilty would be subjected to criminal
prosecutions. However, the criminal justice system in the United
States, as in most nations, is far from ideal. Because of the crudity
of American criminal statistics it is difficult to estimate the number
of innocent people charged with criminal offenses. Available data
suggest that the number is substantial.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that in 1974 there
were 2,164,000 arrests in the United States for "major crimes."'4 Only
eighty-one percent of the adults arrested for major crimes were ac-
tually prosecuted, 5 and only seventy percent of those prosecuted were
convicted, of either the offense charged or a lesser offense.6 This
means that 43.3 percent of the adults arrested for major crimes,
approximately 522,837 persons, were acquitted or had their cases
dismissed. Unfortunately, these national statistics, like a few bone
fragments from a newly discovered prehistoric creature, permit only
a rough guess about the dimensions of the problem. They do not tell
us how many of those arrested were not prosecuted because the au-
thorities deemed it simpler to revoke probation or parole or to release
them to another jurisdiction. Nor do they indicate how many of the
convictions were reversed on appeal or set aside on collateral attack.
They also tell us nothing about the reasons for dismissals. By lumping
together acquittals, dismissals leading to subsequent prosecution or
reinstitution of correctional measures, and dismissals resulting from
such common causes as lack of probable cause, refusal of the victim
to prosecute, insufficient evidence, interest of justice, and death or
insanity of the accused, the Bureau's statistics run afoul of the famil-
iar canon against adding apples and oranges.7
One important part of the explanation for the high percentage
of criminal charges dismissed prior to trial involves the day-to-day
functioning of the law of arrest. In legal theory arrests should be
made without prior judicial approval only in exceptional cases.' But
since the prerequisite for issuance of an arrest warrant for a fe-
F.B.I., UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 179 (1974). "Major crimes" are defined as murder,
manslaughter, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, breaking and entering,
larceny, theft, and auto theft.
5 Id. at 46. Forty-one percent of these arrests were referred to juvenile authorities. The
Uniform Crime Reports are silent about the number of exonerated juveniles.
6 Sixty-one percent were guilty as charged, and the remaining nine percent convicted of a
lesser included offense. Id.
A more revealing statistical breakdown was available for California until 1964.
CALIFORNIA BUREAU OF CRIMINAL STATISTICS, CRIME IN CALIFORNIA 48 (1964). See also
section VIII infra.
W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO CUSTODY 15 (1965).
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lony-probable cause-is the same as the prerequisite for a felony
arrest without a warrant, few policemen bother to secure warrants tO
arrest suspected felons? In most American jurisdictions a policeman
can arrest a misdemeanant without a warrant only for an offense
committed in the officer's presence,10 though a few states have
adopted statutes permitting arrests for misdemeanors committed out-
side the presence of the arresting officer to be made without a war-
rant." Hence the great bulk of arrests are made without prior judicial
approval. Even when police officers do seek an arrest warrant, judges
routinely issue such warrants after a perfunctory examination of the
legal sufficiency of the allegations. 2 In legal theory all arrests are
made with the reasonable expectation of securing a conviction. In
practice many arrests are made simply to harrass or to detain the
suspect for further questioning. 3 This abuse of the criminal law is
facilitated by criminal statutes that permit police to arrest for such
vague crimes as being a "suspicious person" or a "vagrant.""
Pretrial screening of cases that should not be prosecuted is nor-
mally performed by four different agencies: prosecutor, magistrate,
police, and grand jury. Which agency or combination of agencies
performs this screening function varies widely from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. In jurisdictions where prosecutors exercise little supervi-
sion over the police, more cases are dismissed at the preliminary
hearing for lack of probable cause and grand juries more often refuse
to indict than in jurisdictions where prosecutors actively supervise the
police. 5
I Id. at 17. That this common practice still has the Supreme Court's seal of approval was
recently confirmed in United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
z W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 17.
W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 403-04 (1972).
'2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 8, at 15-16.
11 See Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf 1961 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 38-39; Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process. 69 YALE
L.J. 543, 580-86 (1960).
11 See W. LAFAvE, supra note 8, at 301-16; Douglas, Vagrancy and Arrest on Suspicion,
70 YALE L.J. 1 (1960); FOOTE, Vagrancy Type Law and its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REV.
603 (1956). The United States Supreme Court has declared several statutes of this type void
for vagueness. Papchristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (vagrancy ordinance). Palmer
v. Euclid, 402 U.S. 544 (1971) (suspicious person ordinance); Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S.
611 (1971) (loitering ordinance).
15 For example, in Cook County, Illinois (Chicago), magistrates dismiss 43% of the cases
brought before them for preliminary hearing, while in Los Angeles County only about 10% of
the cases are dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage. In Los Angeles County as many as
50% of the cases presented by the police for prosecution are dropped before a charge is filed,
while in Cook County a case normally does not come to the prosecutor's attention until after
a charge is filed by the police and preliminary examination is held. L. HALL, Y. KAMISAR, W.
LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 850-51 (3d ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited
as HALL].
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The key decision maker in the pretrial screening process in most
jurisdictions is the prosecutor. Grand juries generally hear only the
evidence a prosecutor wants to present, and are frequently criticized
for being "rubber-stamps for the prosecutor." 6 In some states the
information-an affidavit signed by the prosecutor-serves as the
functional equivalent of a grand jury indictment for all crimes. 7 In
other states felonies require a grand jury indictment, but misdemean-
ors may be prosecuted simply by information. 8 Judges and magis-
trates tend to be overly reluctant to dismiss charges at the preliminary
hearing. The accused is generally forced to stand trial if the prosecu-
tor can muster anything resembling a prima facie case. 9
Prosecutors dismiss charges for many reasons. Lacking person-
nel, resources, and desire to prosecute every criminal case brought to
their attention, prosecutors constantly have to pick and choose
among the cases which they will attempt to pursue to conviction.2
Further investigation may convince the prosecutor of the defendant's
innocence, or disclosure of facts by the defendant or his attorney may
persuade the prosecutor that alternatives to the criminal pro-
cess-.e.g., psychiatric treatment or restitution-would be more ap-
propriate. Factors such as the death or disappearance of a witness,
or the granting of a suppression motion, may convince the prosecutor
that he is unlikely to be able to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Some charges may be dropped or reduced in exchange for a
plea of guilty or for an agreement to testify or inform against other
offenders.2 ' Sometimes charges are dismissed for technical defects
and refiled after rectification of the defects. Or the prosecutor's office
may have a policy against prosecuting certain kinds of offenses, such
as violations of the "blue laws" or social gambling, and uniformly
dismiss all such cases referred to it.22
The U.S. criminal justice system casts its net much too broadly.
" Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System, 10 ORE. L. REV. 101, 295 (1931); Whyte,
Is the Grand Jury Necessary, 45 VA. L. REV. 461 (1959).
11 HALL, supra note 15, at 788-89.
I d.
" See. e.g.. Note, Preliminary Hearings on Indictable Offenses in Philadelphia. 106 U.
PA. L. REV. 589, 606 (1958); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in
Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1166-69 (1960).
2 F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 154-
72 (1970); LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. CoMP. L. 532,
533-35 (1970); Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 174
(1965).
21 See D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITH-
OUT TRIAL 67-130 (1966); Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining. 36 U. CHI. L.
REV. 50 (1968); Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas. 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865 (1964).
u Other reasons commonly given for refusing to prosecute are: (1) the victim has asked
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Included within its sweep are many who may be technically guilty but
whom society's representatives do not wish to prosecute, as well as
large numbers of persons who are innocent in fact or who cannot be
proved guilty. Most of these persons are screened from the system
prior to trial, but not before many innocent persons suffer substantial
damages in the form of pretrial detention, counsel fees, lost wages,
humiliation, and loss of reputation.
II. PRETRIAL DETENTION IN THE UNITED STATES
Whether an accused will be subjected to pretrial confinement in
the United States is largely a function of the bail system. 23 An ar-
rested person is typically brought before a judge or magistrate who,
except in capital cases, will set a monetary sum as bail. In theory,
this sum is to be determined by the judge's best guess at the amount
necessary to secure the accused's appearance at trial. 4 In practice
most judges also consider the seriousness of the charge and the dan-
gerousness of the accused. 25 If he and his family or friends can post
bond, or pay the nonrefundable premium demanded by a professional
bail bondsman-usually ten percent of the face amount of the
bond-the accused is released. If they cannot, the accused remains
in jail until his case is resolved."6
Each year hundreds of thousands of persons are detained in
American jails,27 under conditions generally much harsher than those
that the offender not be prosecuted; (2) the costs of the prosecution would be excessive, consid-
ering the nature of the violation; (3) prosecution would cause undue damage to the offender;
(4) alternative civil proceedings are sufficient. See LaFave, supra note 20, at 534-35.
23 See generally, STUDIES ON BAIL (C. Foote ed. 1966); R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM: A
CRITIQUE OF THE AMERICAN BAIL SYSTEM (1965); D. FREED & P. WALD, BAIL IN THE UNITED
STATES: 1964 (Report to Nat'l Conf. on Bail and Criminal Justice, 1964).
24 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
"' D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 23, at 18-21.
26 In recent years the bail system has been subjected to much scathing criticism, and
reform efforts have made considerable headway in some jurisdictions. The Bail Reform Act of
1966, Pub. Law 89-465, 80 Stat. 214, modified the federal bail system to permit release on
personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond unless a judicial officer determines that
such release "will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3146(a)(1 970). If such determination is made, thejudicial officer may impose restrictions upon
freedom of movement, require execution of a cash bond, or require deposit of only ten percent
of the face amount of the bond, which is refundable if the conditions of the bond are met.
In 1964 Illinois effectively eliminated the bail bondsman by permitting the accused to
deposit with the court the ten percent bail bond premium formerly paid to the bondsman. If
the accused appears for trial, 90% of the sum deposited is refunded. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §
110-7 (1973). Ohio adopted a similar measure in 1973, OHIO RULES CRIM. P. 46 (Page 1975),
as did Kentucky in 1976. Ky. REv. STAT. § 431.530 (Baldwin Temp. Issue 1977). The constitu-
tionality of the Illinois statute was upheld in Schlib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357 (1971).
27 The percentage of defendants who cannot secure their release on bail varies considerably
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of postconviction imprisonment,2 solely because of their financial
inability to post bail. A substantial percentage of those detained will
never be convicted.29 Moreover, while the evidence is inconclusive,
empirical studies suggest that, ceteris paribus, a detained defendant
is more likely to be convicted than a defendant free on bond."
III. THE ENORMOUS COST OF PRESENTING AN ADEQUATE
CRIMINAL DEFENSE
The cost of properly defending a criminal prosecution can be
staggering, impoverishing all but the very rich or the already indigent.
Recent, highly publicized cases illustrate this point vividly. Nixon's
aide, John Ehrlichman, reportedly spent $400,000 on his defense.3'
Patty Hearst's defense by F. Lee Bailey is expected to cost at least
$175,000;32 Bailey himself spent $350,000 for his own defense against
charges of conspiracy to defraud investors arising from his involve-
ment with Glenn Turner.3 Even though the Pentagon Papers prose-
cution was aborted in mid-trial because of governmental misconduct,
the cost of defending Daniel Ellsberg and Anthony Russo reached$900,000. 31
To be sure, such expenditures are atypical. The typical criminal
defense consists of negotiating a plea bargain.35 However, the ade-
from place to place. For example, in past years it has been 79% in St. Louis, 75% in Baltimore,
71% in Miami, 57% in San Francisco, 54% in Boston, 48% in Detroit, and 44% in New Orleans.
D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note 23, at 40.
u See A. TREBACH, THE RATIONING OF JUSTICE: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THE
CRIMINAL PROCESS 82-83, 264 (1964); L. KATZ, L. LITWIN & R. BAMBERGER, JUSTICE IS THE
CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN FELONY CASES 56-58 (1972).
" In the New York Bail Study, 163 of the 1660 detainees (9.8%) had their cases dismissed
following a refusal by the grand jury to indict. Of the 89 detainees who went to trial, 18 (20.2%)
were acquitted. Roberts and Palermo, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City.
106 U. PA. L. REv. 693, 726-27 (1958). In the Philadelphia Bail Study one-fifth of all detainees
were not convicted-nearly two-thirds of these persons were acquitted, and the other third were
either not indicted or had charges dismissed. Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Admin-
istration of Bail in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1050 (1954).
" This was conceded by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 n.35
(1972) (citing Wald, Pretrial Detention and Ultimate Freedom: A Statistical Study. 39
N.Y.U.L. Rev. 631 (1964)). Rankin, The Effect of Pretrial Detention, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 641
(1964), found that 47% of those on bail were not convicted, while 27% of those detained were
not convicted. This ratio remained more or less constant even when some of the more obvious
variables were controlled. Similar correlations were suggested by the New York and Philadel-
phia Bail Studies, supra note 29. But see Landes, Legality and Reality: Some Evidence on
Criminal Procedure, 3 J. LEG. STUDIES 287, 333-37 (1974).
11 TIME, Jan. 13, 1975, at 14.
3 TIME, Feb. 16, 1976, at 49.
M Id. at 50.
1, TIME, May 21, 1973, at 30.
21 Between 70 and 85% of all felony defendants enter guilty pleas; the percentage of guilty
pleas is even higher in misdemeanor cases. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN
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quacy of most criminal defense work is questionable." Despite the
poor quality of representation in most criminal cases, counsel fees for
defending a felony charge frequently run several thousand dollars.
Additionally, there may be outlays of several hundred dollars per day
for investigators and/or expert witnesses, plus a bail bond premium,
which is likely to cost somewhere between $200 and $1,000.
None of these expenditures can be recouped if the defendant is
acquitted or the charges are dropped. Indeed, these expenditures are
usually not even tax deductible.17 Thus for most nonindigent Ameri-
can families the costs of a criminal defense constitute a crushing
hardship, regardless of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
IV. HYPOTHETICAL CASES FOR COMPENSATING THE INNOCENT
ACCUSED
Consider the plights of these three hypothetical defendants, each
the victim of an erroneous criminal charge:
(1)
Paul Poe is indicted on a robbery charge after being positively
identified as the perpetrator by the victim. Bail is set at $10,000; in
default thereof Poe is confined to the county jail for five months
awaiting trial. Poe adamantly insists on his innocence, and refuses
numerous entreaties from his court-appointed counsel to plead
guilty to a lesser offense. Shortly before Poe is scheduled to go on
trial, the police arrest Jones on a robbery charge. While questioning
Jones an alert policeman notices that Jones closely resembles Poe,
and asks Jones about the robbery for which Poe has been indicted.
Jones readily admits committing that crime. On seeing Jones and
Poe together, the victim retracts his identification of Poe and states
that Jones was indeed the culprit. The prosecutor, with permission
from the court, enters a nolle prosequi, and Poe is released from
custody with sincere apologies from the prosecutor's office. After
his five month jail stay Poe discovers he has lost his job and his wife.
(2)
Rita Roe is arrested and indicted on a forgery charge after
being identified by the victim from a suggestive display of photo-
graphs. Bail is set at $10,000 and Roe is released on bond. Roe hires
an able criminal defense attorney to represent her. Defense counsel
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 11-12 (4th ed. 1974).
u See Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (1973);
Blumberg, The Practice of Law as Confidence Game: Organizational Cooptation of a
Profession, I L. & Soc. REV. 15 (1967).
11 Only if the criminal charge arises from a defendant's business-related activities will the
expenses of defending against it be deductible. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687
(1966).
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succeeds in suppressing the out-of-court identification, and at trial
presents a handwriting expert who establishes that the forged instru-
ment was not written by Roe. Had the police and prosecutor investi-
gated the case more carefully, they would have realized that Roe
was not the forger. The jury brings in a verdict of acquittal. As a
result of the erroneous prosecution, Roe has used up her life savings
to pay her attorney a fee of $10,000, plus $1,000 for the bail bonds-
man and $1,000 for the expert witness. In addition, profits at Roe's
advertising agency have fallen $500 a month during the year in
which she was under indictment.
(3)
Following an argument with a prostitute over the value of serv-
ices rendered, Clarence Coe is arrested and charged with rape. Bail
is set at $10,000 and Coe is released on bond. In obtaining the
indictment the prosecutor failed to inform the grand jury that the
complainant's reputation and credibility were dubious, and falsely
represented to the grand jury that a paint stain on Coe's shorts was
actually blood which matched the type of the complainant. Because
on a prior occasion the complainant had falsely accused a client of
rape, the prosecutor offers to reduce the charge to assault in return
for a plea of guilty. Coe insists upon his innocence. Coe's attorney
demolishes the prosecution's case, and the jury acquits. As a result
of the rape charge, Coe has incurred expenses of $10,000 for his
attorney, $1,000 for the bail bond premium, $500 for a chemist, and
$500 for an investigator. He was also fired from his job as a high
school principal.
In all three hypotheticals the law would regard any damages
suffered by the defendants as damnum absque injuria. Had Poe, Roe,
or Coe been convicted and sentenced to prison before discovery of the
mistake, they would have an action against the government for dam-
ages only if the prosecution had been initiated by the federal govern-
ment, California, Illinois, New York, or Wisconsin."8 And since
Poe's entire confinement was pretrial, no American jurisdiction af-
fords him a right of recovery against the government.
If, as in Coe's case, the complainant had instituted the prosecu-
tion maliciously and without probable cause, the accused would have
a cause of action for damages against her.37 However, since the com-
plainant is likely to have a very shallow pocket, any judgment would
probably remain unsatisfied even if such a suit were successful. Had
a See note 3 supra.
' The elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are usually stated as: (1) institution
or continuation of a criminal proceeding by the defendant against the plaintiff, (2) acquittal or
dismissal of the criminal proceeding, (3) lack of probable cause for the criminal proceeding,
and (4) malicious intent on the part of the defendant, i.e. his primary purpose was not to bring
an offender to justice. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 834-50 (4th ed. 1971).
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the police made an arrest without probable cause, Poe, Roe, or Coe
might have civil actions for false imprisonment against the arresting
officers." Or had the police violated their constitutional rights, e.g.,
by engaging in unreasonable searches or seizures, the defendants
would have actions for damages against the police under the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.41 But even if the prosecutor knowingly presents
perjured testimony and wilfully misrepresents the evidence, as in the
third hypothetical, the victim of such prosecutorial misconduct has
no damage remedy under state or federal law.42  In all three
hypotheticals the defendants' only hope of receiving compensation
would be enactment of a private bill by the state legislature. If past
"* Despite the high incidence of illegal arrests in the United States, relatively few successful
actions against the police for wrongful imprisonment have been maintained, and even fewer
have resulted in actual recovery of substantial damages. Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493 (1955). Probable cause and good faith
are generally considered valid defenses. During a twelve year period in Los Angeles, the police
won 91% of the false imprisonment cases; damages in the successful suits averaged only .05%
of the amount claimed. Coakley, Law and Police Practice: Restrictions in the Law of Arrest.
52 Nw. U.L. REV. 2, 5 (1957).
11 In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), the Supreme Court sustained a civil action
for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the Chicago police for an unlawful invasion of
the plaintiff's home and illegal search, seizure, and detention. Subsequent cases have imposed
liability on state officials for unlawful arrest, Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307 (D. Colo.
1967), and wrongful imprisonment, Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968). See generally
Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape, and the Frontiers Beyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV.
277 (1965). Liability for an illegal search or false arrest was extended to federal law enforce-
ment officers in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Similar liability
has been extended to the United States government by Act of March 16, 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-253, § 2, 88 Stat. 50. In response to a series of unconstitutional "no-knock" raids by federal
narcotics agents, Congress amended the Federal Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (Supp.
1974), to deprive the federal government of the defense of sovereign immunity in cases in which
law enforcement officers, acting under federal law, commit the torts of assault, battery, mali-
cious prosecution, or abuse of process.
However, victims of illegal arrests, searches, or seizures by county or municipal law
enforcement officers have generally been frustrated in their search for a "deeper pocket" by
the Supreme Court's rulings that municipalities and counties are not "persons" within the
meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and hence are immune from suit under § 1983. Monroe v. Pape,
supra, 365 U.S. at 187-91 (1961); Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 698-710 (1973).
Attempts to impose liability on municipalities for constitutional torts of their officers by
invoking the constitution directly, as in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, supra, have
met with mixed success in the lower courts. See Note, Damage Remedies Against Municipali-
ties for Constitutional Violations, 89 HARV. L. REV. 922, 927-29 (1976). And an attempt to
press 42 U.S.C. § 1981 into service to impose liability upon a municipality for an allegedly
racially motivated unlawful arrest was recently quashed by the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania. Mahone v. Waddle, D.C. Civil No. 75-760 (Dec. 12.
1975), pending appeal Nos. 76-1377 and 76-1378.
42 Prosecutors and other law enforcement officers are generally held to have immunity
from malicious prosecution suits. See generally W. PROSSER, TORTS 837-38 (4th ed. 1971). The
same considerations underlying common-law immunity have led the Supreme Court to the
conclusion that prosecutors have absolute immunity in.damage suits brought under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
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experience is any guide, the likelihood that such a bill would be
enacted and would provide adequate compensation is extremely
small.43
V. THEORETICAL BASES FOR COMPENSATION
Three legal theories have been suggested to impose liability on
governments for damages resulting from criminal prosecution of in-
nocent persons: (1) fault-based torts of its agents, (2) eminent do-
main, and (3) strict enterprise liability." The third theory is concep-
tually superior.
When the agents of the state willfully or negligently prosecute
an innocent person, the familiar tort concept of respondeat superior
should apply. In hypotheticals (2) and (3) above, the exercise of due
care by police, prosecutor, or judge would have avoided the prosecu-
tion of an innocent person. Imposition of vicarious liability on the
state makes sense in such cases. No sound tort principle would distin-
guish the innocent victim of a negligently operated postal truck from
the innocent victim of a negligently operated criminal justice system.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is as obsolete and intellectually
bankrupt in either situation.41
The basic difficulty with a negligence-vicarious liability theory
is that it does not go far enough. It offers no cause of action to the
victim of an honest mistake, such as Poe in the first hypothetical.
Moreover, the burden of proving negligence by the police or prosecu-
tor would be extremely difficult for the typical accused. Fault or
negligence is too thin a strand to support governmental liability in
this area.
The eminent domain analogy is a strained basis for imposing
liability on the government for erroneous prosecutions. The law of
eminent domain was developed to deal with governmental appropria-
tion of private property, not personal liberty. Indeed, the cases hold
11 E. RADIN, THE INNOCENTS 239-56 (1964) collects sixty-nine cases in which innocent
persons were convicted. In fifty-two cases no compensation was awarded. In two cases from
New York awards in excess of $100,000 were made by the court of claims, and in one case a
$5,000 award was made by the United States Court of Claims. In the remaining fourteen cases
the legislatures passed private bills awarding compensation. These bills totalled $165,000 for
sixty-eight years of wrongful imprisonment, an average of $2426.27 per year.
" Borchard, State Indemnity for Errors of Criminal Justice. 21 B.U.L. REv. 201. 207-
08 (1941). suggests two theories: (1) the eminent domain analogy and (2) the workmen's
compensation analogy. See Note, Compensation. supra note 3, at 1098, 1107. 1112 for a
discussion of tort liability and a recategorization of Borchard's workmen's compensation anal-
ogy as strict enterprise liability.
" See Mikva, Sovereign Immunity: In a Democracy the Emperor Has No Clothes. 1966
U. ILL. L.F. 828, 839-41; Note, Compensation, supra note 3, at 1103-07.
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that compensation is not required if the government curtails property
rights in exercise of the police power. 6 While it is often difficult to
distinguish taking under the power of eminent domain from property
regulation under the police power,47 the latter is clearly the source of
governmental authority to arrest persons accused of crime. The prin-
cipal utility of the eminent domain analogy is to identify the paradox-
ical inversion of values in our legal structure: the taking of private
property for public benefit requires compensation while taking of an
innocent person's liberty does not.
The preferable doctrinal basis for requiring the state to compen-
sate the innocent accused is strict enterprise liability. Regardless of
the standard of care exercised by police and prosecutors, wholly inno-
cent people will sometimes be subjected to criminal prosecutions.
Some of these people, through no fault of their own (unless poverty
be considered a fault), will be confined prior to trial; others may be
financially or emotionally crushed by the trial. As between the ac-
cused and the state, it is more just to place the loss caused by the
inevitable errors of the criminal justice system on the state. Not only
is the defendant the innocent victim, but also insuring against such
loss is not yet practicable. 9 The state has erroneously set in motion
the criminal justice system, which may be appropriately analogized
to a dangerous instrumentality. Moreover, the state is the ideal
agency to spread the risk of loss over the entire societys0 The repara-
tion of damages caused by erroneous criminal accusations, irrespec-
tive of how well founded they seemed, is properly a cost of the opera-
tion of the criminal justice system. It is difficult to see why the
innocent victims should be forced to absorb this cost.
In addition to righting serious injustices, imposition of strict
state liability would bring important collateral benefits. First, impos-
ing these costs on the state may discourage police and prosecutors
from bringing groundless prosecutions, or at least induce greater
circumspection in invoking the machinery of the criminal justice sys-
tem. Second, some innocent persons who presently plead
11 See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
17 See Dunham, Griggs v. Allegheny County in Perspective: Thirty Years of Supreme
Court Expropriation Law. 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 63; Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness:
Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165
(1967); Sax, supra note 46.
, See Note, Compensation, supra note 3, at .109-11.
" Growth of group legal services programs is beginning to fill part of this insurance gap.
See generally, Bernstein, Legal Services as a Social-Political Movement. 4 U. TOL. L. REV.
423 (1973). Comment, Group Legal Services and the Organized Bar, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 228 (1974).
"1 See Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity, 61 YALE L.J. 1172
(1952).
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guilty-often in exchange for a sentence of time served while awaiting
trial-would have more of an incentive to insist upon their inno-
cence.5' Third, the compensation award might serve as a much-
needed status elevation ceremony for innocent victims of criminal
charges. Even if the accused has been acquitted or had the criminal
charges dropped, the mere existence of the formal accusation results
in a status deprivation. Insurance companies and prospective employ-
ers will ask whether an applicant has ever been arrested, and many
will presume guilt despite the dismissal or acquittal. 2 As the next
section makes clear, an acquittal or dismissal of criminal charges
does not prove the defendant's innocence. Seldom does a defendant
have a mechanism to clear himself completely of any suspicion of
misconduct.
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF AN ACQUITTAL
In the United States an acquittal in a criminal prosecution does
not necessarily mean that the defendant is innocent in fact-that he
did not do what he was alleged to have done. An acquittal means only
that the prosecution failed to satisfy the judge or jury of the defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; it is consistent with a variety
of hypotheses, which should be treated differently for the purposes
of compensating the "innocent" accused.
Just as prosecutors frequently drop charges for reasons having
nothing to do with a defendant's actual guilt,53 judges and juries
regularly acquit for a myriad of reasons unrelated to whether the
defendant acually committed the activity charged. Consider this
simple hypothetical: D is charged with the murder of V and is acquit-
ted. An acquittal would be consistent with a jury's believing one or
more of the following hypotheses:
(1) D did not kill V.
(2) More probably than not D killed V, but there still remains a
reasonable doubt.
11 There are a variety of reasons for an innocent person to plead guilty. See Note,
Voluntary False Confessions: A Neglected Area in Criminal Administration. 28 IND. L.J. 374
(1953). There are no data as to the frequency with which innocent people plead guilty in order
to resolve their status quickly and avoid the uncertainty of a trial sometime in the future, but
the incidence is high enough to cause trial judges concern. D. NEWMAN, supra note 21. at 24.
See also A. TREBACH, supra note 28, at 84-87.
" See Schwartz and Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma. 10 Soc. PROB. 133
(No. 2, 1962). describing an experiment in which the authors found that "an individual accused
but acquitted of assault has almost as much trouble finding an unskilled job as one who was
not only accused of the same offense but also convicted."
See notes 20-22 supra and accompanying text.
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(3) D killed V in self-defense.
(4) D killed V in circumstances establishing the defense of necess-
ity.
(5) D's act of killing V was involuntary (e.g., committed during
an unconscious or somnambulistic state).
(6) D killed V by accident or mistake.
(7) At the time D killed V, D was insane, or there was at least a
reasonable doubt about D's sanity.
To convict, not only must the prosecution prove that D killed V
(actus reus), but it also must establish the requisite mental state
(mens rea). The prosecution must also be able to negative such af-
firmative defenses as mistake, duress, necessity, or self-defense. Even
then D is not legally guilty of the crime unless the prosecution can
establish these factual propositions in a procedurally regular fashion
and in compliance with constitutional rules designed to protect the
integrity of the process. 4
In some instances a defendant is acquitted only because the
prosecution failed to prove its case properly. Poor police investiga-
tion, death or disappearance of a key witness, or unconstitutional
police behavior may all result in the inability of the prosecutor to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A coerced confession, an
illegal wiretap, or an unlawful search may clearly establish the defen-
dant's guilt as a matter of fact, but the exclusionary rule makes such
evidence inadmissible in court.55 The prosecutor himself may cause a
dismissal in a case in which evidence of guilt is overwhelming, such
as when he fails to prosecute soon enough to ensure a speedy trial,56
or engages in intentional misconduct.57
Even when the prosecution has proved the defendant's guilt be-
yond a reasonable doubt, juries and even judges may still acquit. Such
acquittals are often the product of sentiment that the penalties pre-
scribed are too harsh, that the activity involved ought to be decrimin-
alized, that the victim received what he deserved, that the defendant
has already been punished enough, or that alternative private sanc-
tions or treatment will be effective.58
51 Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process. 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16-17 (1964).
Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 278 (1968) (excluding illegal wiretap evidence); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (excluding illegally seized evidence); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959) (excluding an involuntary confession).
" The only remedy for denial of a defendant's right to a speedy trial is dismissal with
prejudice. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
11 It has been held that double jeopardy is a bar to prosecution after a mistrial provoked
by the introduction of evidence that the prosecutor knew to be false. United States v. Kessler.
530 F.2d 1246 (5th Cir. 1976).
H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 242-312 (1966); D. NEWMAN, supra note
21, at 131-96.
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VII. LIMITING THE CLASS OF DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO RECOVER
Compensation of the entire group of defendants who have been
acquitted or who have had charges against them dismissed would be
politically unpalatable and socially unwise. Some members of this
group are factually guilty, others could be factually and legally guilty,
and others should be considered as if they were. There are two princi-
pal problems: drawing the line between the compensable and non-
compensable accused, and deciding what procedure should be used
to distinguish between the two groups.
A. Which Innocent Persons Ought To Be Compensated?
One might try restricting the right to compensation to those who
are innocent "in fact." But what does this mean? Is the person who
kills during a trance or deep sleep innocent in fact?59 Is the person
who has had sexual relations with a minor whom he reasonably be-
lieved to be above the age of consent innocent in fact in a jurisdiction
like California, which recognizes such mistake as a defense?" Is the
person acquitted of a charge of larceny solely because his voluntary
intoxication negatived an intent to steal innocent in fact?" Is the
person acquitted solely because the police entrapped him innocent in
fact?612
Innocence often does not separate neatly into the two categories
of factual and legal innocence. In many cases the determination that
a person is innocent of a crime is a mixed determination of law and
fact. Whether a person who has been entrapped into committing an
offense is factually innocent depends to a large extent upon the legal
theory of entrapment to which one subscribes.63 In England a suc-
5, Such a person would be acquitted in the United States, either on the theory that he has
not engaged in a voluntary act (no actus reus), or that he lacked the requisite mental state to
commit the offense (no mens rea). W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note II, at 337.
" Most American courts hold that reasonable belief that a minor was above the age of
consent is no defense to a statutory rape charge. Myers, Reasonable Mistake ofAge: A Needed
Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MIcH. L. REv. 105 (1965). In People v. Hernandez, 61 Cal. 2d
529, 39 Cal. Rptr. 361, 393 P.2d 673 (1964) the Supreme Court of California reversed sixty-
eight years of precedent and recognized such a defense.
"1 Case law in the United States recognizes such a defense. Edwards v. State. 178 Miss.
696, 176 So. 57 (1937); Jamison v. State, 53 Okla. Crim. 59, 7 P.2d 171 (1932).
,2 Entrapment is generally recognized as a defense to certain kinds of crime. See DeFeo,
Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility. Its History, Theory and Application. I
U.S.F.L. REV. 243 (1967).
" A majority of the United States Supreme Court has adhered to the theory that, as a
matter of statutory interpretation, the legislature impliedly did not intend to punish the "un-
wary innocent" who were lured into the commission of a criminal offense by the instigation of
law enforcement officers. This approach would deny the defense to persons predisposed to
commit the offense. A strong minority of the Supreme Court has viewed the function of the
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cessful insanity defense results in a verdict of guilty but insane; in the
United States the verdict takes the form of an acquittal by reason of
insanity. In many states the effect of an acquittal by reason of insan-
ity is indefinite incarceration in a state institution that is, with the
exception of its name, remarkably similar to a state penal institu-
tion.6" Depending on which legal theory a state employs, a person who
believes he is buying stolen goods that are not in fact stolen may be
considered both legally and factually innocent of any crime, or guilty
of an attempt to'receive stolen goods. 5
Focusing on technical concepts of guilt and innocence tends to
obscure the real issue: which persons should be entitled to bring a
claim for compensation for being erroneously charged with a crime?
The right to make such a claim ought to be extended to every person
who can demonstrate: (1) that he has been formally charged with a
criminal offense (excluding minor misdemeanors), (2) that he has
been acquitted, or that the charge has been dropped, and (3) that he
did not commit either the offense with which he was charged or a
lesser included offense. For the purpose of this test, an acquittal by
reason of insanity should be considered a conviction. An affirmative
defense to such a claim should be that the charge against the claimant
was triggered by his misconduct or negligence, unless the police or
prosecution have displayed even greater fault, in which case the
claimant's fault ought to mitigate damages. But good faith behavior
by the police or prosecutor should not be a general defense.
Thus the person who falsely confesses to a crime because of a
desire for notoriety or punishment is both legally and factually inno-
cent; however, since he is largely to blame for his own arrest, compen-
sation ought not be awarded. Similarly, a person acquitted of a lar-
ceny charge because he was too drunk to form the specific intent to
steal may be both legally and factually innocent but should not be
compensated because he brought the prosecution on himself. A per-
son acquitted on a narcotics possession charge solely because the
narcotics were illegally seized should not be entitled to compensation.
His remedy would remain a civil rights damage action against the
offending law enforcement officers, or a suit under the Federal Tort
Claims Act if the perpetrators of the illegal search were federal law
defense as policing the police, and would accord the defense to both those predisposed to violate
the law as well as the "otherwise innocent." United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 440-43
(1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting). See also Hampton v. U.S., 96 S. Ct. 1646 (1976).
" See Goldstein and Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense'-Why Not?. 72 YALE L.J. 853
(1963): Goldstein and Katz, Dangerousness and Mental Illness, Some Observations on the
Decision to Release Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 70 YALE L.J. 225 (1960).
Compare People v. Jaffe, 185 N.Y. 497, 78 N.E. 169 (1906). with People v. Siu, 126
Cal. App. 2d 41, 271 P.2d 575 (1954).
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enforcement officers.6 A person acquitted on a narcotics possession
charge because of entrapment should be allowed to recover, though
the extent to which his own misconduct brought about the charge
may be considered in reducing the damage award.
B. Procedure for A warding Compensation
Unlike a criminal prosecution, the burden of establishing
nonculpability properly belongs on the claimant. As in civil actions
for damages, the claimant ought to bear the burden of proving his
case by a preponderance of the evidence. The difficult question is the
type of procedure to be followed in deciding such damage claims. The
compensation claim could be litigated as part of the criminal trial,
in a separate civil action for damages, or in an action before a special
administrative body.
1. Compensation Awards as Part of the Criminal Trial
There are several ways in which the issue of damages for erro-
neous pretrial detention might be resolved in a criminal trial. One is
simply for the jury or the judge in a bench trial to award damages
simultaneously with a verdict of acquittal. This implies a de facto
shift to the tripartite verdict used in Scotland: guilty, not guilty, and
not proven guilty. 7
The principal advantage of this procedure is judicial economy.
It avoids the necessity of a new trial to relitigate essentially the same
material. But there are disadvantages. There is a serious risk that
jurors will become confused about who bears the burden of proof,
comparative fault, and the difference between the standards of "rea-
sonable doubt" and "preponderance of the evidence." Some jurors
might vote to convict in doubtful cases because of the mistaken im-
pression that the acquitted defendant would be entitled to compensa-
tion if acquitted.
Jury confusion could be avoided by having the compensation
issue decided by the trial judge following acquittal or entry of nolle
prosequi after the start of the trial. But this procedure deprives the
accused of a jury trial on the issue of damages. It also requires
another trial, albeit abbreviated since the judge has already heard at
least some of the evidence in the case. Alternatively, a separate hear-
ing on damages might be held before the acquitting jury, which would
, See note 41 supra.
"See Smith, Scotland: The Trial Process, in THE ACCUSED: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 68,
74-75 (J. Coutts ed. 1966).
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be sent back to deliberate with specific instructions about the precise
issues under consideration and the burden of proof on each.
2. Compensation Awards Through a Separate Civil Action
A second technique would be to permit the acquitted or dis-
charged accused to bring a separate civil action against the state for
damages arising from the erroneous criminal accusation. In this ac-
tion the plaintiff would have to prove innocence by a preponderance
of the evidence; however, evidence of the acquittal or dismissal should
meet the burden of initial production on this issue. The state would
be able to defend on the ground that the claimant brought about the
criminal charge by his own negligence or misconduct. In rebuttal, the
claimant should be allowed to show that the fault of the police or
prosecutor exceeded his own.
This formulation has the disadvantage of requiring a second trial
to relitigate issues which have been largely aired, but it would encom-
pass claims by any innocent defendant rather than the more limited
group of defendants actually acquitted at trial. Moreover, it would
tender the issues in'a straightforward, clear-cut proceeding, with
more extensive discovery available. The most serious disadvantage of
this proceeding is that the indigent accused would have difficulty
finding a lawyer to bring his suit. Many such claimants would be
indigent, and the inability to afford a lawyer might effectively pre-
clude recovery. 8
3. Compensation Awards by Special Administrative Agency
The use of a compensation board or claims agency has the ad-
vantages of a separate civil suit without some of the disadvantages.
Any person acquitted of a serious criminal charge, or who has had
such a charge against him dropped, would be entitled to bring a claim
before such an administrative agency. The agency could be staffed by
lawyers, who would make quasi-judicial determinations of the merits
of each claim. Appellate judicial review should be permitted, as is
now done with regulatory agencies, so that the ultimate responsibility
for determining and regulating standards would be with the courts.
As in the separate civil action in the courts, the accused would
have the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
he did not commit the offense with which he was charged, and that
his own misconduct did not invite'the charge. The administrative
agency could devise relatively relaxed rules of procedure and evi-
" See Note, Litigation Costs: The Hidden Barrier to the Indigent, 56 GEo. L.J. 516
(1968).
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dence, facilitating the filing of pro se claims by indigents. Such an
administrative agency could proceed far more quickly than a court,
particularly if it adopted a schedular form of damages. 9 One tradeoff
for this simplified procedure would be considerably reduced discov-
ery. Another is that inviting a claimant to proceed without a lawyer
may lead to nullification of his right to compensation in practice, for
establishing one's innocence without a lawyer is likely to be a difficult
task.
C. Recoverable Damages
The choice of procedure one adopts may be largely a function
of one's approach to damages. Two basic methods for determining
damages appear feasible: (1) a statutory damage schedule as used in
the areas of workmen's compensation and no-fault insurance; and (2)
the tort approach, in which the victim can recover all damages proxi-
mately caused by the wrongful accusation. Recoveries determined by
either method should exclude punitive damages.
Under the first method the victim would be entitled to recover
statutorily specified minimum and maximum sums for the wrongful
arrest, pretrial detention, attorneys' fees (unless paid by the govern-
ment), bail bond premium, and lost earnings. However, he would
recover nothing, or only a nominal sum, for the mental anguish
caused by the wrongful accusation, since the schedule would limit
recovery to actual economic loss. 7 0 Even though under certain cir-
cumstances damage to one's reputation may be considered actual
economic loss, the difficulties of proof would preclude recovery of
more than a nominal sum for this item.7'
Under the second method the victim would be able to recover
actual out-of-pocket expenses, such as bail bonds or lawyers' fees,
irrespective of whether these expenses totaled $1,000 or $100,000. Re-
covery would also be permitted for lost earnings or profits as well as
other economic injuries. As in tort cases, recovery should include
intangibles, such as injury to reputation and mental anguish, to the
extent they can be proved.
The advantages of the schedular method are speed, simplicity,
and economy. It avoids difficult problems of proof that are typically
" See section VII.C. infra.
"' Workmen's compensation awards do not pretend to restore what the claimant has lost.
Instead they are designed to give the claimant "a sum which, added to his remaining earning
ability, if any, will presumably enable him to exist without being a burden to others." Larson,
The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL L.Q. 206. 213 (1952).
11 Recovery of any award of damages should go far toward erasing the damages to an
innocent accused's reputation, for the award would be tantamount to an official certification
of innocence.
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resolved by jury verdicts in tort suits. The proceedings can be more
informal; instead of courts and juries, an administrative hearing offi-
cer or board will suffice. Once a claimant establishes that he has been
wrongfully accused, calculation of the damages due from the statu-
tory schedule becomes largely a clerical task. Damage awards are
likely to be considerably less than jury awards, particularly if there
is a ceiling on the total recovery. A relatively low ceiling, such as
$ 10,000 or $15,000, would permit a state to limit its exposure and may
make the proposal more politically palatable.
The advantage of the tort method is that it affords a more com-
plete recovery. The purpose of nonpunitive damage awards is to res-
tore the plaintiff to the economic position which he would enjoy were
it not for the wrongful act. Only rarely will the schedular method
achieve this aim, for an innocent accused suffers many types of dam-
age. One is time lost from gainful employment or other pursuits. For
the accused who cannot make bail, the average period of pretrial
detention is about a month, though in some jurisdictions the average
runs as high as 110 days.72 A substantial number of employed defen-
dants lose their jobs when arrested; the percentage fired increases
dramatically for those unable to make bail. There is a vast disparity
in the amounts of income foregone because of criminal charges.
Some defendants have no earnings to lose; others, such as lawyers or
doctors suspended from practice until resolution of the charges
against them, may have very substantial lost earnings.
Another variable is damage to one's reputation. A charge of rape
or sodomy will be far more damaging to most people than a charge
of violation of the antitrust laws or of illegal campaign contributions.
For some defendants, particularly for professionals or political fig-
ures, virtually any criminal accusation represents a very real and
substantial injury to reputation. Even if there has been an acquittal
or a dismissal of all charges, the cloud of suspicion frequently re-
mains, causing enormous hardship to the persons involved. On the
other hand, many of those erroneously accused will be persons with
long criminal records whose reputations are likely to suffer only
nominal damage.
Still another variable is the suffering and humiliation caused by
the arrest and/or pretrial confinement. The period of pretrial deten-
tion varies widely, as do the conditions of confinement. In many cases
the conditions of confinement are much harsher for those awaiting
trial than for those who have been convicted. Pretrial detention facili-
" The statistics vary considerably from city to city. See D. FREED & P. WALD, supra note
23. at 39-41.
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ties are frequently overcrowded and offer few recreational opportuni-
ties; moreover, homosexual assaults are common in jails.7 3 Utiliza-
tion of a statutory formula for damages stemming from pretrial de-
tention is likely to overcompensate some and undercompensate otf-
ers.
Of course, it is possible to construct numerous variations on
these two basic methods so that their differences begin to blur.
Formulas can be worked out under which the amount recoverable
varies with the seriousness of the offense charged, the number of days
lost from work, and the actual sums expended on one's legal defense;
specific sums can even be factored in for mental anguish and damage
to reputation. Alternatively, jury verdicts could be limited to specified
amounts or to actual pecuniary loss.
VIII. THE COSTS OF COMPENSATING THE INNOCENT ACCUSED
The objection will undoubtedly be raised that the costs of permit-
ting recovery from the state for erroneous accusations will be astro-
nomical. Professor Borchard, whose pioneering articles were largely
responsible for the existing United States legislation compensating
the wrongfully convicted, felt obliged to urge a ceiling of $5,000 on
such awards to protect the public treasury. 74 In retrospect, such a
ceiling has proved ridiculously low and wholly unnecessary.75
Nevertheless, compensating the convicted innocent involves con-
siderably less exposure than compensating those merely accused. The
high percentage of those arrested for serious offenses who have
charges dismissed (nationally about forty-three percent) suggests sub-
stantial potential liability. However, the percentage of this group that
will not be able to demonstrate lack of culpability will undoubtedly
be quite large.
Experience under the Scandinavian compensation schemes
suggests that the number of successful claimants will be small. In
Norway during a five-year period (1953-1958) one author discovered
only thirty-five persons who had been compensated, with the average
award totaling about $1,300 .7 During a corresponding five-year pe-
'3 See Davis, Sexual Assaults in the Philadelphia Prison System and Sheriffs Vans. 6
TRANSACTION 8 (1968); State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971) (Seiler, J., dissenting).
u Borchard, supra note 44, at 209.
7 See note 43 supra. One should recognize, however, that $5,000 in 1938 is the equivalent
or $15,012 in terms of 1976 purchasing power.
I Bratholm, supra note 1, at 839-40.
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riod in Denmark awards totaled only about $12,000.7 To be sure, the
United States has many more crimes than these countries. It is also
possible that unfounded arrest and prosecution are less common
under Scandinavian procedures. 7 But the figures do suggest at least
that the costs involved will be manageable. If such costs prove exces-
sive, a reasonable ceiling can be placed upon the damages recovera-
ble. If such a limitation becomes necessary it will demonstrate that
something is radically amiss in the administration of our criminal
system.
IX. CONCLUSION
Adoption of a right to compensation of the innocent accused is
long overdue in the United States. The proposition that governmental
agencies ought to bear responsibility for private injuries resulting
from their agents' tortious acts has become eminently respectable.
There is no substantial basis for treating the injuries caused by the
erroneous operation of the criminal justice machinery differently
from those caused by any other piece of governmental machinery.
The peculiarities of the criminal justice system do make the ascertain-
ment of those entitled to compensation difficult, but the task is as
feasible as many other court determinations. Forcing the innocent
citizen to subsidize the criminal justice system by absorbing the costs
of its errors is not only grossly unfair to the individuals involved, but
also cloaks from public scrutiny the true costs of operating the crimi-
nal justice system. Were these true costs transferred to a line item in
governmental budgets, not only would serious wrongs be righted, but
prompt and highly desirable reform of present free-wheeling police
and prosecutorial practices might well result.
" Id. at 840. See also Gammeltoft-Hansen, Compensation for Unjustified Imprisonment
in Danish Law, 18 SCANDIN. STUD. IN LAW 27, 51-52 (1974), indicating that between 1966
and 1972 the Danish Ministry of Justice approved the award of compensation in only 34 cases:
the total sum awarded was only about $12,500.
11 Butsee Bratholm, Arrest and Detention in Norway, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 336,339 (1960).
which suggests that the practice of police arresting without a warrant is just as widespread in
Norway as in the United States, even though the law theoretically requires a warrant.
